The basic measure for Inter-Rater`s reliability is a percentage agreement between advisors. In response to American assertions that Britain is making a « policy of power » in Greece, Churchill responded in a speech: « What is power politics?… Is a navy twice as big as any other navy in world power politics? Is the world`s largest air force, with bases in all parts of world power politics? Do we have all the gold in the politics of world power? If that is the case, we are certainly not guilty of these offences, I must unfortunately say. These are luxury products that have gone from us.  Churchill reflected the lingering bitterness towards American criticism of his policy during the Dekemvriana and in 1947 presented the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine as a belated American recognition of the correctness of his Greek policy and wrote how subsequent events had « perfectly justified » his action.  Churchill opposed the statement of the sitting Secretary of State Dean Acheson before the Senate in 1947 that the victory of the Greek Communists in the Greek Civil War was « dangerous » for the United States and the American « vehement criticism » of British policy in dekemvriana.  At least part of the reasons Churchill revealed the agreement as a percentage in triumph and tragedy was to present himself as a far-sighted statesman who had cleverly signed the percentage agreement to prevent the Soviet Union from supporting the EAM.  After Churchill`s description of the incident, Churchill suggested that the Soviet Union should have 90 per cent influence in Romania and 75 per cent in Bulgaria; the UK is expected to have 90 per cent in Greece; And they should each have 50 percent in Hungary and Yugoslavia. Churchill wrote it on a sheet of paper which he pushed back to Stalin, who dragged it and returned it.      The result of these discussions was that the percentages of Soviet influence in Bulgaria and, more importantly, Hungary were changed to 80 percent and Romania to 100 percent. Although Yugoslavia was not considered as important as Italy and Greece, Churchill had insisted in June 1944 that a coalition government merge the provisional government of federal democratic Yugoslavia in 1943, proclaimed by Field Marshal Josip Broz Tito in 1943, with the Yugoslav government in exile, led by King Peter II.  Churchill hoped that with Stalin`s help he could convince Tito to accept King Peter II, believing that maintaining the Karasoor-Evia house would ensure that Yugoslavia remained at least partially within the British sphere of influence after the war.  However, unlike Greece and Italy, where British ships along the Suez Canal route had to pass, this was not the case for Yugoslavia, which led Churchill to give less importance to this nation.